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I. INTRODUCTION
A S MANY countries around the world begin deploying smart grids, security is becoming a major concern. In particular, fine-grained information reporting in smart meter networks has been shown to be a major privacy risk [1] , [2] . A number of privacy preserving data aggregation protocols have been proposed and studied for application to this problem [3] . Typically these protocols have focused on spatial (i.e., aggregating information from many meters at one instance in time) or temporal (i.e., aggregating information from one meter over a period of time) aggregation and have often focused on computing only the summation function. Secure multiparty computation (MPC) offers a capability to compute any function (including summation) while mitigating privacy risks. Due to its perceived complexity, it has not, however, seen a lot of application into smart meter networks. In this work, we propose an optimization to MPC which enables efficient and highly scalable privacy preserving computations to be performed in-network (i.e., by the meters themselves) of not only the summation function but also more complex functions (e.g., standard deviation).
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) deals with the problem of n parties, each with private inputs x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , who wish to compute a function of their inputs, say f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), with out revealing their inputs. The result of the computation can be released to any subset of the n parties or even to a third party who has no input. As an example of MPC, consider the task of computing the aggregate sum of household meter readings at one time instance in the smart grid. The n parties are meters installed on households in a neighborhood or city. Each party uses its instantaneous usage reading as its input. The function f is summation and some authorized party (e.g., a supplier, distributor or generator) would learn sum(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and nothing else. Similarly, MPC can be used to compute other functions like the standard deviation privately by the meters in the network. Computing complex utility functions while still preserving privacy is a difficult open problem [3] . MPC offers one potential solution to the problem, but MPC protocols are quite complex and therefore have not been successfully applied to complex in-network, smart grid computations.
In this work we present a new construction for MPC, namely transferable MPC (or T-MPC) which we show to be orders of magnitude more efficient at computing certain in-network, privacy preserving complex computations in the smart grid. To better motivate T-MPC, consider the following scenario. Say we are still interested in computing f = sum for four parties called Alice, Bob, Chuck and Doug with inputs x a , x b , x c , x d . In traditional MPC, if Doug is unavailable, Alice, Bob and Chuck must wait until he is available to begin the computation. Clearly this is inefficient, as sum(x a , x b , x c , x d ) = sum(sum(x a , x b , x c ), x d ) Alice, Bob and Chuck could proceed with computing the sum of their inputs and, when Doug finally arrives, let him join in on the computation to add his input to get the final result. There are a number of technical limitations to applying MPC in this manner as traditional MPC assumes a static set of computation parties. T-MPC solves this problem by allowing partial computations from one set of parties (e.g., Alice, Bob and Chuck) to be transferred to a new set of parties (e.g., Alice, Bob, Chuck and Doug) without revealing intermediate computation values. The new set could be a superset, subset or completely independent of the original set of parties. This specific example of T-MPC generalizes to cases where f is composed of other functions, for example f = g(
Another example of the utility of T-MPC is in optimizing certain computations. For example, consider a very large set of parties, say n = 1,000,000 and again f = sum. Using traditional MPC directly for this computation is very inefficient as all n must participate in all portions of the computation. Since many standard MPC protocols rely on secret sharing inputs, such a computation would require each party to share its input with the n − 1 other parties. This is very inefficient and becomes unwieldy as n grows larger and larger. One technique commonly used to fix this inefficiency is to have the parties share their inputs with a small number of computation servers instead of all other parties. The computation servers carry out the computation of f on behalf of the inputters. This technique, however, presupposes the availability of such servers and an infrastructure for communicating with these servers. In the smart grid, wireless sensor networks, and potentially many other applications, this assumption will not necessarily hold. T-MPC solves the problem for certain computations without the additional assumptions by allowing small groups to compute local results and securely transfer the computation. This is probably best illustrated by considering a tree structure as depicted in Figure 1 . Using T-MPC, parties R1, R2 and R3 can compute the sum of their inputs and transfer the result to B1, B2 and B3 without revealing their individual inputs or the intermediate sum. Similarly G1, G2, G3 and Y1, Y2, Y3 compute the sum of their inputs and transfer the result up. When B1, B2 and B3 receive input from all of the parties below, they sum those values privately along with their own inputs and send the necessary information to K1 so that the result can be reconstructed. More generically, siblings compute their portion of the computation, combine it with results from their children, and transfer the computation to the next level up in the tree. Being able to structure computations in this fashion leads to much more efficient computations while still providing privacy of individual inputs and intermediate results.
In this work, we develop the idea of T-MPC and show its utility by applying it to computations in the smart grid. In particular, we present a method for turning secret sharing based MPC protocols into T-MPC protocols and look at specific examples in both the honest-but-curious model and the malicious model. We give security proofs of our T-MPC protocols. Finally we look at how T-MPC can be used to optimize certain in-network computations in the smart grid. We find that T-MPC is orders of magnitude more efficient than simply using existing MPC protocols for in-network smart grid computations. For instance, for the standard deviation function and using a common MPC protocol, an example smart meter network with around 700 meters would take approximately fifteen minutes to complete the computation. On the other hand, using T-MPC, we find that we can compute the standard deviation of over a million meter nodes in just a few seconds.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Adversary Model
In this paper, we will look at protocols that are secure in the honest-but-curious (HbC) model and protocols which are secure in the malicious model. The HbC model assumes that the adversary (who may control multiple parties) behaves honestly in executing the protocols as described but will use any information gleaned during protocol execution to attempt to violate another party's privacy. The malicious model, on the other hand, assumes that the adversary will do anything to violate another's privacy. This includes deviating from the protocol specification. Just looking at the two models, it is easy to see that malicious model protocols are more secure. This added security comes at a cost in performance which we will see later. We assume non-adaptive (or static) corruption of parties. In other words, the set of corrupted parties is chosen by the adversary a priori and does not change throughout the execution of the protocol. Furthermore we assume secure, point-to-point channels and an authenticated broadcast channel.
MPC protocols typically include a security threshold for the number of adversary controlled parties. For example, an MPC protocol may be secure for up to t = n/2 or possibly t = n − 1 adversary controlled parties. T-MPC is no different in this regard, however we modify the requirement slightly in that we require that the threshold must hold for each set used for computation instead of the overall set of parties. Therefore, if P is the overall set of parties involved in the computation (where |P| = n is the size of the set) and subsets P 1 , . . . , P m with sizes n 1 , . . . , n m will be computing portions of the overall computation, then we instead restrict the adversary to controlling up to some threshold t i of the parties of P i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The actual threshold will depend entirely the MPC protocol we use to build our T-MPC protocol. For example, if using the honest-but-curious protocol from [4] which has a threshold t < n/2, each threshold for T-MPC should be t i < n i /2. Similarly, the malicious model protocol from [4] has a threshold of t < n/3, so t i < n i /3. We will be using both of these protocols later in constructing HbC and malicious model T-MPC protocols.
We note that by changing the threshold requirement in T-MPC, we do effectively weaken the adversary model. To illustrate this, consider a network with n = 1000 and n i = 3. In the HBC adversary model, using traditional MPC, we could tolerate up to 499 corrupt parties. In T-MPC, there would be around 333 different computation sets each of size 3. We could tolerate 1 corrupt party in each computation set for a total of 333 corrupt parties in the overall set P. We feel that in certain applications weakening the adversary model is justified for the following reasons. First, in traditional MPC, if the adversary can corrupt enough parties, he can violate all privacy. Additionally, it does not matter which parties the adversary corrupts, all that matters is the number of corruptions. In T-MPC, however, corrupting a party here and there might leak some private information, but not all. Furthermore, to leak all private information, the adversary target specific deviced to corrupt. Corrupting parties at random will not be sufficient to guarantee that all private information is leaked. The defender can make this even more difficult by changing how the parties are divided into subsets. The second reason we feel that weakening the adversary model is justified is that in many applications (including the smart metering application we study) we can expect the true number of corrupt parties to be fairly low, well below the security threshold. In the future, we plan to study the implications of the weakened adversary model under other application scenarios to better understand its justification and look at ways to optimize system parameters to minimize the decrease in tolerated corruption.
B. MPC
MPC first came on the scene of cryptography research in the 80's with protocols roughly divided into two classes, the garbled circuit class [5] and the secret sharing class [6] , [7] . We focus on the secret sharing class in this work as it is more commonly used for n > 2. Furthermore, the secret sharing class with honest majority (i.e., t < n/2) is very efficient as it avoids public-key operations. This level of efficiency is ideal for low computation power devices like what we would expect see in smart meters. As we focus on the secret sharing class, we now present a brief introduction to Shamir's secret sharing method as it is the secret sharing method we will use in our construction of T-MPC. We note, however, that T-MPC in general does not require the use of Shamir's method. The construction we give for T-MPC which uses Shamir's secret sharing could easily be adapted to MPC protocols which use additive secret sharing for example.
Say a party holds a secret s which he would like to share with n other parties such that any p of them can reconstruct s. Furthermore, if p − 1 or fewer try to reconstruct s they should learn no partial information about s. Shamir gives a protocol for doing this in [8] that works as follows. All computations are performed in Z q with q being a prime larger than n and s ∈ Z q . We begin by randomly choosing p−1 values from Z q , say c 1 , . . . , c p−1 and constructing the polynomial
To compute a share of the secret s for party i we compute s i = σ (i ) and send s i to party i . To reconstruct the secret, given at least p shares, we compute
For simplicity in our notation, throughout this paper we will assume that all n shares are used for reconstruction. Let S p n be the Shamir sharing function and R be the reconstruction function. Given the secret sharing and reconstruction functions, we can construct our MPC protocols. We'll begin with an MPC protocol which is secure in the HbC model. This protocol comes from Goldreich et al. [6] and is secure as long as t < n/2. We let p = t in this case. The parties begin by representing the function to be computed as an arithmetic circuit built up with addition and multiplication gates, an example of which is shown in Figure 2 with the input "wires" at the bottom and the output "wire" at the top. Next, they share their inputs using S p n with the other parties in the computation. To compute an add gate on two inputs, say d and e, each party simply adds the shares of the inputs they hold
Multiplication gates are not quite as simple. Mathematically, the product of two shares is a share of the product of the inputs, but there are two problems. The degree of the secret sharing polynomial increases, and the coefficients of the polynomials are no longer independent. Therefore MPC protocols use some sort of routine involving communication among the parties and additional computation to achieve multiplication on secret shared values. In our case, the parties begin by multiplying the shares. They then use S p n to share this value with the other parties. We'll call these shares, subshares. At this point, each party has n subshares (one from each other party in the computation) which they run through R to get a new share of the product of the inputs. This process corrects the two problems described above. The exact implementation details of how this works and proofs of correctness and security are beyond the scope of this paper, and we refer the reader to [6] for those details. At the end of the circuit, the parties hold shares of the output value. These shares are sent over a secure channel to the parties authorized to learn the output of the function who use R to reconstruct the output.
Malicious model MPC protocols typically add a preprocessing phase that runs before the process just described. During the preprocessing phase, helper data is generated which allows the four building blocks just described (share, reconstruct, add and multiply) to be secure even in the presence of parties who deviate from the protocol specification. This helper data is independent of the inputs to the computation and the function to be computed. For the type of MPC protocols we will be looking at in this work, the helper data includes shares of multiplication triples which are sharings of numbers a, b, c such that c = ab and sharings of random numbers. These sharings are guaranteed to be correct even if parties are malicious. The multiplication triples are used to help compute multiplication gates and the random sharings are used by the parties to share their inputs securely. For specifics on how the preprocessing phase works, we refer the reader to [4] . The malicious model MPC protocol we use is secure as long as t < n/3 and we set p = n/2.
C. Universally Composable Security Framework
Proving the security of protocols can be a difficult process. One technique that has been used in many areas of cryptography, and in particular, in multiparty computation, is the universally composable security (UC) framework due to Ran Canetti [9] . As we will use this framework for proving the security of T-MPC, we briefly review the basics of the framework and how to prove security in it. For further details, we refer the reader to Canetti's work cited above and [4, Secs. 1.3 and 3.4]. Our description here focuses primarily on privacy concerns in multiparty computation.
The basic setup of the UC framework begins with two worlds, the ideal world and the real world, and a number of parties p 1 , . . . , p n . In the ideal world, we construct an ideal functionality F that is secure by definition (often using a trusted third party). In the real world, we construct a protocol π which realizes the ideal functionality. Our goal is to show that π is as secure as F . In each world there is an entity called the environment, denoted Z. In each world, there is an additional party, the adversary A in the real world and a simulator S in the ideal world. These parties communicate their views of their respective worlds back to Z. To keep the setup as generic as possible, we let Z provide the inputs to the parties. This setup is shown in Figure 3 .
Cannetti proves two fundamental theorems behind the UC security framework which we now present. The UC security theorem says that if Z cannot distinguish between the two worlds, then the protocol π, run in the real world, is as secure as the ideal functionalty (which was secure by definition). We now describe how to do this, focusing our discussion on privacy concerns but note that the UC framework does not only apply to privacy. Our description is adapted from the description of Cramer et al. in [10] .
In the real world, the execution of π leaks information to A, who in turn, shares his view of the world with Z. Let L π be the information leaked during execution of π, which forms A's view of the world. In the ideal world, we let F leak only very specific information to S, information that can readily be shown to not violate any party's privacy. Call
Since L F , by definition, does not violate anyone's privacy, L π also does not violate anyone's privacy. Therefore, we can conclude that π does not violate anyone's privacy. Note that in practice no two runs of π will result in identical L π sets. Similarly, the L π generated by S will not be identical to a specific L π from the real world. Therefore, we only require that the L π generated by S be indistinguishible from the leaked information sets coming from the real world.
The second theorem of Canetti's work, the composability theorem, says that UC-secure protocols can be composed with each other and themselves in arbitrary (even adversary controlled) ways and still the resulting composition will remain secure. The result of this second theorem is that one can decompose a complex protocol into many smaller, subprotocols, prove the security of the subprotocols using the first theorem, then show how they compose together to form the original protocol, which is also UC secure due to the second theorem. We leverage these two theorems to prove the security of the T-MPC construction we give later.
III. T-MPC
We now present T-MPC by showing how it can be built using an MPC protocol and a transfer protocol which redistributes shares from one set of parties to another set without revealing either the original shares or the secret from which they were derived. We then give concrete, Shamir secret sharing based, constructions for the transfer protocol in the HbC model along with a security proof in the UC framework.
A. Overview
Assume we have a set of parties P who are in some way involved in the computation of a function F. In particular and without loss of generality, let each p i ∈ P have an input x i for the computation of F. Furthermore, assume F can be broken up into a number of other functions (i.e., subfunctions) f 1 , . . . , f k where the inputs of (possibly overlapping) subsets of P, say P 1 , . . . , P k , are needed to compute f 1 , . . . , f k . An example of such a function is given in (3).
Using a standard MPC protocol, a number of these computations can be carried out directly by subsets of the parties involved (e.g., f 2 and f 4 in (3)). It is only when one function uses the output of another function (or possibly many other functions) that standard MPC would have a problem with a divided up computation (e.g., f 1 and f 3 in (3)). Say f i uses the output of f j as one of its inputs and that f j can be computed with a standard MPC protocol (i.e., it does not depend on any other function). Clearly if the parties in P i each had shares of the output of f j , they could compute f i using the same standard MPC protocol. Thus, given a transfer protocol which transfers shares from parties in P j to parties in P i , the computation of f i could proceed using a standard MPC protocol. Putting this together we get the T-MPC protocol in Figure 4 .
One simple way to transfer the output of f j to the parties in P i would be to have each party in P j send their shares directly and securely to different parties in P i . There are some issues with this, however. First, it will only work if n i = n j . A more grievous problem exists though. It is possible that some parties of P i and some parties of P j are controlled by the adversary. If the adversary controlled parties of P i receive copies of shares from benign parties in P j , the adversary controlled parties of P i and the adversary controlled parties of P j might be able to collude to learn information that they would otherwise not be able to learn. Another option would be to have parties in P j reconstruct the output of f j and then create new shares for the parties in P i , but this reveals additional information which goes against our stated goals and could violate a party's privacy. We now present transfer protocols which are secure in both adversary models and do not suffer from these problems. Indeed these protocols can be used to transfer shares from any P j to any P i without revealing any additional information. Combining this transfer protocol with an MPC protocol secure in the same model results in a secure T-MPC protocol. Using the UC security framework, we prove the security of our transfer protocols.
As both HbC and malicious model MPC protocols exist which are UC secure, we can pair our transfer protocols with the appropriate MPC protocols to achieve UC secure T-MPC protocols.
B. Honest-But-Curious Model Transfer Protocol
To build our HbC transfer protcol, we exploit an interesting feature of linear secret sharing schemes. This feature has been exploited previously in MPC multiplication protocols (see [4] , [11] ) and was more generically explored in [12] . In our explanation below, we focus on Shamir secret sharing, but the method generalizes to other linear secret sharing schemes as well [12] .
The transfer protocol works as follows. We have two sets of parties P i and P j (which may overlap) of sizes |P i | = n i , |P j | = n j . The parties in P j hold shares of some value, say s. Call these shares s 1 , . . . , s n j . At the end of this transfer protocol, we need new shares s 1 , . . . , s n i which are also shares of s where p i ∈ P i holds s i . We do this by having each p j ∈ P j create n i shares using a polynomial of degree t i − 1 similar to (1) with a(0) = s j . These shares are distributed to the parties in P i . In other words, each party in P j shares their share of s with the parties in P i . Once all shares have been distributed, each party p i ∈ P i holds n j shares, which they use as input to Eq. (2) which, thanks to the linearity of the secret sharing method, results in the desired s i (i.e. a new share of s for the parties in P i ). At this point in the computation of F, computation of f i can complete using the standard MPC protocol. If the output of f i is needed for some other function, the same protocol can be run to redistribute the shares of the output of f i to another set of parties. If instead f i is the final step in computing F, the shares of the output of f i are sent to the parties authorized to learn the output of F. We summarize this protocol in Figure 5 .
1) Correctness and Complexity: Security and correctness proofs for the transfer protocol for redistributing secret shares from P j to P i follow easily from [12] . That work guarantees that, first, subsets of participants in P i up to size t i have no information about the secret. Second, that as long as at least t j parties of P j erase their information about s (both their original shares and the subshares they created), then s can only be recovered by parties in P i . Finally, subsets of parties in P i and P j cannot collude to gain extra information about s as long as their sizes are no bigger than t i and t j respectively. Since generating shares and recombining shares using interpolation can be done in parallel by all parties, these methods are quite efficient. Straightforward algorithms for generating the shares (polynomial evaluation) and recombining (Lagrange interpolation) are quadratic, but there exist O(n log 2 n) algorithms for each [13] . Even the quadratic algorithms would be sufficiently fast for most applications. As the n j parties must communicate each of their n i shares, the communication complexity is O(n j n i ) (assuming only one communication channel). Since really only the threshold t needs to be satisfied, the computation and communication requirements can be made even more efficient in practice.
2) Security: It seems to make sense that the T-MPC protocol we have suggested is secure as long as the MPC protocol we choose is also secure. This would seemingly follow from the fact that the transfer protocol itself is secure. We seek a more rigorous approach to proving the security of our proposed protocol, however. For this we turn to the Universal Composability (UC) framework.
The UC framework provides a nice approach for proving the security of our T-MPC protocol as there already exist UC-secure MPC protocols. Therefore, proving security of our T-MPC protocol requires proving the UC-security of the transfer protocol as our T-MPC protocol is the composition of an MPC protocol and the transfer protocol. Since two UC-secure protocols can be composed in arbitrary ways and still be UC-secure, the security of our T-MPC protocol follows directly from the composition theorem. Following the UC framework, we now describe the ideal functionality and show how Z cannot distinguish between the two worlds.
Ideal Functionality: 1) Each party in P j sends its share of s (i.e., s j ) to F . 2) F uses the shares to reconstruct s and generates new shares of s, say s i , with threshold n i /2. 3) For each corrupt party p j ∈ P j , F sends s j to S. 4) For each corrupt party p i ∈ P i , F sends s i to S. 5) F sends the share s i to p i ∈ P i .
Security Proof:
The ideal functionality we just described is very simple and clearly secure by definition as F acts as a trusted third party. Furthermore, due to the assumed threshold of corrupt parties, the shares that F leaks to S do not violate anyone's privacy. These shares form the set L F . To prove security of the real world protocol, we now describe how S and F interact to make the ideal world indistinguishable from the real world.
In the real world, Z's view consists of information learned by A. This includes: 1) shares held by corrupt parties in P j , 2) new shares held by corrupt parties in P i , 3) subshares generated by corrupt parties in P j , and 4) subshares sent to corrupt parties in P i . These four pieces form the set L π . Notice that L F is basically the first two items. So, S must compute the third and fourth items using only what is in L F and do so in a manner which makes the resulting set indistinguishable from L π in the real world. Using the shares of corrupt parties in P j , S can simply create subshares of these to form number 3 from above.
Number 4 is a litte more difficult to simulate as each corrupt party in P i will receive a subshare from each corrupt party in P j . In other words, some of the subshares that S just generated to satisfy number 3 have to be used directly to satisfy number 4. For the remaining subshares needed to satisfy number 4, we cannot simply use random values as the interpolated polynomial would likely not have the correct degree. The degree of the polynomial should be n i /2. Let c be the number of corrupt parties in P j . Therefore, for each corrupt party p i ∈ P i , we already have c shares to satisfy number 4. We set a zeroth share to be the new share for p i that comes from number 2 above. We then pick n i /2 − c other shares at random. Interpolating these shares should (with high probability) give us a polynomial of degree n i /2 (if not, we can try again). We can use that polynomial to generate the remaining shares for each corrupt party in P i to satisfy number 4.
We now show that the L π the simulator just generated is indistinguishable from the L π that results from executing π. There were basically four parts to these sets that we described above. Indistinguishability of the first two comes directly from the fact that the adversary does not control enough parties to run Shamir's reconstruction step. Therefore, they each contain no information in the information theoretic sense. Indistinguishability of the third comes from the fact that in both worlds, these subshares are valid subshares. Like generation, showing indistinguishability of the fourth is a little more difficult. In the real world, the subshares in number 4 result in valid new shares held by corrupt parties in P i . Recall though, that since the adversary does not control enough parties in P i that the new shares are random from the adversary's point of view. Given the way we have constructed the subshares in number 4, they form valid subshares of the new shares found in number 2 and come from a correct degree polynomial. Furthermore, the subshares are random. Therefore, they are also indistinguishable in the two worlds. So, we conclude that the protocol in Figure 5 is UC-secure.
C. Malicious Model Transfer Protocol
We now detail our construction of a malicious model transfer protocol. We start by looking at where the HbC transfer protocol would have problems if executed with malicious parties. First, corrupt parties in P j may not generate subshares correctly. They may share some arbitrary value instead of s j . They may not use random coefficients in their sharing polynomial, or they may not use the proper threshold in the polynomial. Finally, they could also send arbitrary values to the parties in P i . On the other side, corrupt parties in P i use some arbitrary value for s i . We also need to watch out for corrupt parties in P i and P j colluding. Techniques using verifiable secret sharing have been developed for handling these sorts of issues have been used in other scenarios in the past [14] , but unfortunately they will not work in our scenario. Instead, we leverage the fact that in our malicious model MPC protocol t < n/3 but p = n/2 when computing secret shares to our advantage. McEliece and Sarwate noted that with these parameters, Shamir secret sharing is a particular instance of the Reed-Solomon error correction code [15] . In particular, we can use a Reed-Solomon decoder on the shares to achieve robustness, i.e., as long as the dealer is honest, we can detect and correct errors and are guaranteed to recover the correct secret. The question is, who is the dealer? The dealer is actually distributed among the parties in P j . Notice that in Figure 5 each party in P i receives one share from every party in P j . These n j shares are used in the reconstruction step. Since in P j we know that there are fewer than n j /3 corrupt parties, it must be the case that there are more than 2n j /3 shares received by each party in P i that are good. This means honest parties in P i are guaranteed to recover the correct s i by using a Reed-Solomon decoder instead of the traditional Shamir reconstruction step. Corrupt parties in P i can also reconstruct the correct share. If they choose not to use it in later stages of execution, they will be caught by the malicious model MPC protocol. Therefore, by simply replacing Shamir reconstruction with a Reed-Solomon decoder, we are able to turn our HbC transfer protocol into a malicious model transfer protocol.
1) Correctness and Complexity:
We have already outlined the correctness of our protocol in the preceeding paragraph. The complexity only changes due to the fact that we use a Reed-Solomon decoder instead of the Shamir reconstruction step. Fast O(n log 2 n) as well as straight forward O(n 2 ) decoders exist [15] . We have noticed, however, that for small sets of parties, a brute-force O(n!) decoder is faster. In this decoder, we run all subsets of shares of size n/2 through the Shamir reconstruction step then use a simple majority rules heuristic to determine the output.
2) Security: We follow the same paradigm for proving security in the malicious model that we followed in the HbC case. The setup in this case, however, is more complex as corrupt parties can now deviate from the protocol specification. A common technique for handling this is to let the simulator S run a (black box) copy of the adversary's code A. The ideal functionality is shown below. Following the ideal functionality, we give a high-level overview of the security proof, leaving out some of the details as they follow directly from the techniques used in the HbC proof.
Ideal Functionality:
1) The honest parties in P j send their shares to F . 2) F uses the shares to generate the shares of corrupt parties in P j and sends these generated shares to S. 3) F creates subshares for each of the honest parties'
shares and sends any of these which would be delivered to corrupt parties in P i to S. 4) F receives subshares for the corrupt parties in P j from S and verifies these subshares by checking the degree of the polynomial and the constant term of the polynomial from which they came. 5) F uses the valid subshares to generate the new shares, {s i } n i i=0 , and sends s i to p i ∈ P i . It also sends s i to S for each corrupt p i .
Security Proof (Sketch):
As we saw previously, to prove security we describe what S does to make the real and ideal worlds indistinguishable to the environment Z. The set L π from the real world is the same as in the HbC case we saw previously. Recall that this set has four parts to it. The set L F is also the same as it was before and has only two parts to it. The simulator generates the ideal world view of L π using L F in the same manner as above with the exception of allowing A to choose the subshares of part 3. Some of these (potentially corrupted) subshares are used in part 4. To generate the remainder of part 4, S follows a process similar to what was done in the HbC model, but ignores any subshares that A corrupted.
Indistinguishability between the two worlds changes only slightly in the malicious case. Recall that Z's view in both worlds is defined by L π , which consists of the four parts we presented earlier. The first part is the same as in the HbC model, so indistinguishability follows from our previous discussion. Thanks to the robustness reconstruction we do in the malicious model, the second part is also the same as in the HbC case, so again, indistinguishability follows from that discussion. The subshares generated by corrupt parties in P j , which form the third part of L π , are, in both worlds, generated by A, who is the same in both worlds, so they are indistinguishable. The fourth part consists of subsharings of the second part, with some of the subshares potentially corrupted by A. Since A is the same in both worlds, using analysis similar to what we showed in the HbC case for part 4, this part is also indistinguishable. Therefore, since the sets L π are indistinguishable between the two worlds, we conclude that the malicious transfer protocol is UC secure.
IV. SMART GRID COMPUTATIONS
We now turn our attention to applying the T-MPC protocols developed in the previous sections to performing privacy preserving computations in the smart grid. The smart grid exploits fine granularity of information reporting to better optimize various operations like generation, routing, purchasing, forecasting, etc of certain utilities such as electricity, water and gas. In a smart grid, there are many actors in play, including the consumers, the meter device manufacturer, the smart grid operator, the utility producers (e.g., electricity generation companies), the utility distributor (usually the local utility company), and potentially others. Any one of these players could gain a competitive advantage by utilizing the fine-grained information reporting beyond what a consumer would desire. Furthermore, any one of these players could be potentially be vulnerable to a data breach which results in that sensitive information being leaked to unintended parties. For our work in this section, we assume that, at the very least, the device manufacturer is separate from the other players and is trustworthy enough to honestly implement the protocols for privacy preserving data aggregation.
As we discussed in the introduction, there are significant privacy concerns about the fine-grained information reporting that takes place in traditional smart grid setups. One approach to solving this problem is to continue to have meters report all the fine-grained information to all the authorized players and require those players to individually secure the information. Another approach is to follow the principle of least privilege and only give the end nodes exactly what they need, which is typically only a function of the fine-grained information. The latter approach is more desirable from a information security prospective and has seen much research from the community (for example, see [16] - [19] ). Therefore, this appears to be the preferred approach by information security researchers. It is also the approach we follow here.
MPC is just beginning to be explored for application to the smart grid (see [20] ) and in fact has been shown to potentially be more efficient at computing sums than some specialized protocols as it avoids expensive public key operations [21] . MPC has another benefit in that it could be used to compute not just the sum function, but more advanced functions, such as the standard deviation. Thus, MPC in general, and as we will see, T-MPC in particular provides a very interesting capability to the smart grid that prior protocols have been unable to achieve, increasing efficiency and scalability.
In this section, we compare our T-MPC protocols with standard MPC protocols from [4] . We do this to show just how much more efficient T-MPC is for performing in-network computations for the smart grid. We focus our comparison on the computation of the sum and the standard deviation of meter readings at one instance in time. We use these two functions as they represent two ends of the spectrum for privacy preserving computations in the smart grid. Sum has no multiplications where standard deviation has many. Multiplication is typically the most expensive operation in MPC protocols. The input of each meter is their instantaneous power consumption.
A. Experimental Setup
In studying the application of T-MPC to the smart grid, we will assume a network organization similar to that of Figure 1 . We look at various branching factors and various numbers of nodes. We assume that nodes can communicate directly with their sibling nodes, their parent node, and their parent's siblings. We also assume that the root node of the tree can communicate with any other node in the tree (this can be achieved directly or through routing). To simplify our analysis, we assume that each level in the tree is complete.
We will be comparing our T-MPC protocols with the MPC protocols from [4] . In fact, since T-MPC uses a generic MPC protocol with the transfer protocol, we use the same MPC protocol within T-MPC. In other words, we compare the HbC protocol from [4] with our HbC transfer protocol paired with that same HbC MPC protocol. Similarly in the malicious model, we use the malicious model MPC protocol from the same work both to build our malicious model T-MPC protocol and to compare with. We note that the protocols from [4] are UC-secure and thus compose securely with our transfer protocols. The implementation we use for our experiments comes from the VIFF (http://viff.dk) framework which runs on Python. For our meter nodes, we use a Gumstix Overo Earth with a 600MHz processor and 256MB of RAM. While this is more powerful that current smart meters, we would expect similar performance to be achieved in future smart meters possibly by using custom chips. The final result of the computation will be reconstructed by the root of the tree. For this node we use a laptop running an Intel Core i5-540M cpu and 4GB of RAM. For communications, we assume a halfduplex, 250kbps wireless link with a single communications channel.
To assist in our analysis we have timed the operations necessary for MPC on both the Gumstix and the laptop. As add is a constant time operation, we simply measured the average time to add two shares in VIFF. The other three operations (share, reconstruct and multiply) are linear in the number of parties, thus we estimate the coefficients of the line by running computations with various numbers of parties and run linear regression analysis. Table I shows the values we computed for the HbC operations. For the linear operations, we give the coefficients of the line y = c 2 x +c 1 which estimates the time to compute each operation for a given number of parties. Table II show the updated measurements for multiply in the malicious model as well as the estimated polynomial y = c 3 x 2 +c 2 x +c1 to compute the time to run the preprocessing phase. The output in all cases is in milliseconds. The other operations in the malicious model take the same time as in the HbC model. We note that as currently implemented, VIFF does not do robust reconstruction in the malicious model which is why reconstruct is the same in both models.
To get timing information for the transfer protocols, we can also use the measurements above. In the HbC model, the transfer protocol consists of a number of calls to share and reconstruct. Therefore, no additional work is needed. In the malicious model, again we can simply use calls to share. For reconstruct, however, recall that we have decided to use a brute-force Reed-Solomon decoder. This calls reconstruct a number of times and uses a simple majority-rules heuristic to decide on the output, thus we can use the timing information for reconstruct multiplied by the number of times it would have to be called for proper robust reconstruction to build our timing estimate for the malicious model transfer function.
B. Analysis
Using the timing values from Tables I and II, we compute the total time to execute two functions of interest, summation and standard deviation. To avoid division and square roots in the computation of the standard deviation 1 n n i=1 (x i − μ) 2 1/2 , we return just the numerator (it is assumed that the root of the tree knows n). We note that this leaks no additional information when compared to computing the standard deviation in its entirety.
We first turn our attention to comparing MPC with T-MPC. T-MPC allows for parallelizing in-grid computations using the tree structure described above. This results in a significant optimization of both the sum and standard deviation. We fix the network tree branching factor (i.e., the number of children that each node has) to 10 and plot the time to execute each computation. Our results for the honest-but-curious model are shown in Figure 6 . In Figure 7 , we show the results of our experiment repeated using the malicious model protocols.
The benefit of T-MPC is clear. In Figure 6 we see that in the HbC model, using the MPC protocol, we can compute the sum and standard deviations in less than fifteen minutes as long as there are fewer than 2647 and 777 meter nodes respectively. Compare this with T-MPC, however, where even at 10 6 meter nodes, we are still well under the fifteen minute mark. In fact, the protocol execution time with this large of a network takes less than 2 seconds for both the sum and the standard deviation. In the malicious model, shown in Figure 7 , we can see that MPC supports networks of around 2000 and just under 200 for sum and standard deviation respectively. Whereas with T-MPC, again, we can support orders of magnitude larger networks. This illustrates how T-MPC greatly enhances the scalability of the network in our smart metering example. Furthermore, this increased scalability allows for more fine grained information reporting in reasonably sized networks. This is very significant as prior, specialized summation protocols which use homomorphic encryption can only support networks of up to 50 nodes at an information reporting granularity of 60 seconds [21] .
In our comparison between MPC and T-MPC, we used a branching factor of 10 in the construction of the tree. The branching factor determines a number of things including how many shares are used when secret sharing inputs, the depth of the tree, amount of parallelism, etc. In Figures 8 and 9 we plot the time to execute T-MPC for both sum and standard deviation with various branching factors using the HbC protocol and the malicious model protocol respectively. From the figures we can see that branching factor does play some role into the efficiency of the protocol. Here we can see that branching factor is important, but asymptotically, the differences are fairly minor. As the branching factor approaches n (the total number of meter nodes), however, T-MPC in this case becomes equivalent to the underlying MPC protocol. There is another underlying aspect to the branching factor. We have assumed that for a subset of parties P i of size n i that there are t i < n i /2 adversary controlled parties due to the underlying MPC protocol. In the case of a tree structured network n i = BF. Therefore, in the HbC model, for BF = 3 (BF = 4 in the malicious model) there can only be one corrupted party in each subset but for BF = 11 our HbC T-MPC protocol (BF = 16 for malicious model) could handle up to five corrupted parties. Understanding the implications of this is especially important in real world deployments.
V. RELATED WORK
Our work represents the first look into secure multiparty computation where subsets of the parties compute subfunctions of the overall function (many of which are computed in parallel). The intermediate results of these subfunctions are transferred to new subsets of the parties without revealing the intermediate value in order to facilitate the computation of other subfunctions. Eventually, the final result is computed privately and revealed to authorized parties. The end result is a highly scalable MPC protocol which improves latency of computations. Distinct but related notions of parallelizing MPC protocols exist which also improve efficiency, but under different circumstances. For example, [22] uses a somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem which supports SIMD (single instruction, multiple data) operations [23] to enable computations on multiple, distinct inputs at once. Thus, multiple instances of a single computation can be run at the same time. The set of parties participating in the computation remains static. Similarly, [24] uses linear multi-secret sharing to share multiple inputs at once and compute the same function on all secrets in parallel. Again, the parties performing the computation are static. Interestingly, we could potentially instiantiate a T-MPC protocol using these ideas as building blocks with expected gains in throughput. We leave this to future work, however.
Another related idea we alluded to earlier is that of outsourcing multiparty computation. The idea is instead of having each party share their inputs with all other parties, they instead share their inputs with a small number of computation servers which perform the computation and reveal the result to authorized parties. This idea is used in [20] where it is specifically applied to the smart grid and [25] where it is used for private auctions, furthermore it is more formally studied in [26] and [27] . As we stated previously, however, there are plenty of situations where such computation servers will not be available. We note that T-MPC could be useful in such a system, for example, if the computation servers need to change over time (e.g., due to failure). In this case, T-MPC could add robustness to such a system.
Much of prior in-network, privacy preserving smart grid computation research has focused on computing sums over encrypted data using homomorphic encryption. The first works in this area used expensive public key operations such as the Paillier cryptosystem [16] , [17] . Recent work by Ács and Castelluccia uses a very efficient, additively-homomorphic stream cipher but can also only compute sums. Their work does, however, go an additional step and guarantees differential privacy, a much stronger notion of privacy than the one we consider here. This comes at a cost, however, in that there is some accuracy loss in the information computed. We note that their work on differential privacy could easily be added to certain computations performed using T-MPC to make our protocols even stronger.
VI. CONCLUSION
The contributions of this work are as follows. 1) We present a new approach for secure multiparty computation (MPC) which we call transferable multiparty computation (T-MPC). This new approach has added functionality that enables the set of computation parties to change over time without leaking private information when transfering from one set of computation parties to another. 2) We present two protocols for the new approach that are secure in the honestbut-curious and malicious models respectively. As building blocks for our T-MPC protocols, we use MPC protocols from the published literature and propose two transfer protocols, one from each adversary model. 3) We discuss how the composition of these two building blocks forms a T-MPC protocol and prove that the composition of the building blocks is secure under the universal composability framework. 4) We apply our protocols to the problem of in-network, privacy preserving aggregation of smart meter data. In our analysis, we have included a simple computation (summation) and a more complex one (standard deviation). We find that the T-MPC approach greatly increases scalability.
While we feel T-MPC is of general interest in a number of areas, we present its application to in-network, privacy preserving computations in the smart grid. T-MPC is orders of magnitude more efficient than existing MPC protocols when computing values such as the sum or standard deviation of usage information within the smart grid and presents a very interesting option for computing complex functions privately within the smart grid. Our analysis reveals that using a standard HbC MPC protocol from [4] it would take around fifteen minutes to compute the standard deviation in a smart meter network of around 800 devices. On the other hand, using our HbC T-MPC protocol, the same computation can support a million smart meter devices in around a second. We see similar performance gains with our malicious model T-MPC protocol. This makes deployment of T-MPC within the smart grid very scalable.
The MPC protocols we have used require an honest majority. Emerging MPC protocols support a dishonest majority while still being fairly efficient (especially in the online phase). Many of these protocols use additive secret sharing and should easily be able to be turned into T-MPC protocols, but we leave the specific constructions and proofs to future work. Other future work includes studying other functions of interest for smart grid applications to see if they also gain a benefit by using T-MPC. Furthermore, we hope to apply T-MPC to other areas such as wireless sensor networks, cloud computing and distributed reputation systems. We feel that T-MPC can greatly increase the scalability of networks which require privacy preserving computations without requiring extra hardware or links to more powerful computation devices.
